1 6 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



types are reducible to one. He might, for example, find 

 that all mechanical correlations are to be referred to 

 a plan in which the result is pre-arranged. Or he might 

 find that the apparent determination of behaviour by 

 result is due to an infinitely more subtle combination of 

 purely mechanical arrangements which at first escaped 

 him. But even in the latter alternative he would still 

 acknowledge two clearly distinct types of correlated 

 behaviour, in one of which the bearing of act on result 

 is operative, while in the other it is not. He would now 

 hold that this relation is made operative by a mechanical 

 arrangement. But operative it still would be, and this 

 would generically distinguish the type of correlation from 

 the type in which there is no such element operating. 



2. So far, then, our first point. There exist two types of 

 correlation, the first conforming to that of known 

 machines, the second radically differing. Whatever more 

 ultimate unity may be suggested between them, this 

 difference in the nature of correlation will remain, and this 

 difference is established purely by observation of be- 

 haviour. But now comes our further question. We 

 provisionally attributed the second type of correlation to 

 Mind. In so doing we are deserting the test of behaviour 

 pure and simple. Mind is something of which I have 

 direct knowledge within me, and you within you, but 

 neither of us sees, hears, or feels it at work in another. 

 By what logic then is behaviour of any kind attributed to 

 Mind ? The broad answer is as follows. In my be- 

 haviour I am conscious of certain states, acts, processes. 

 For example, when I effect that kind of correlation which 

 I call acting with a purpose, I am aware of the acts and 

 have an idea of the end, and such awareness is within my 

 experience essential to activity of that kind. The sum of 

 all such conscious activity together with the processes in- 

 volved in it and the permanent conditions underlying it 

 constitute that body of my experience which I call my 

 own mind. Now in referring any act of my own to my 

 mind as a cause I may be mistaken. It may be that 

 physical processes of brain and nerve of which I am 

 unconscious form the true vehicle of the act. But in 



