, 



62 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



ment, size, etc., of the object dealt with at any moment 



is to combine or correlate these distinct data, to yield us 



the precise combination, A B, of sense-elements which 



corresponds accurately to the situation as a whole. Each 



element in this combination discharges its appropriate 



motor impulse a, /3, but their union in consciousness 



effects through a machinery which does not enter into 



consciousness a corresponding modification of impulse by 



impulse, of a by /3. The precise function of consciousness 



j then in sensori-motor action is to grasp the unique com- 



1 bination of stimuli, each of which having its special 



1 reaction modified by the concomitant reactions, there 



I follows a response appropriate to the unique situation as a 



whole." 1 



Now, consciousness we know only from within. But 

 the function which consciousness performs in sensori- 

 motor action is definite, and wherever a corresponding 

 combination of data and adjustment of action is formed 

 an exactly corresponding function must exist. We shall 

 A therefore in accordance with our criteria treat all sensori- 

 ^ motor activity as conscious. The same reasoning will 

 apply to conative selection, which we know in ourselves 

 as involving conscious uneasiness and conscious effort. 

 This consciousness in us determines our behaviour, 

 sustaining repeated movements, checking, encouraging, 

 and varying them in relation to their results. A corre- 

 sponding" function must exist when corresponding be- 

 haviour is found, and again in accordance with our rule 

 we shall describe this function as a conscious act. We 

 arrive then at this result, that conation even in its lowest 

 stages is a conscious function. As we know it internally 

 it is a state seeking to pass into some other. In terms of 

 behaviour it is not a uniform response to stimulus but a 

 state governing action by relation to the results at the 

 moment. The grasp of the unique and changing relations 

 involved is the function which we attribute to conscious- 



ness. 2 



1 From the writer's Development and Purpose, p. 54. 



2 It may be asked whether variation to suit unique circumstances is a 

 good test of conation in view of the possibility (suggested above, Ch. II. 

 p. 32, by the example of the linotype) that a machine may be constructed 



