i 3 o MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



about us. Experience has taught us their other qualities, 

 and we have always at hand, ready for immediate use, the 

 knowledge that we have gained. But in dealing with 

 familiar objects in practice, we seldom, unless the occasion 

 calls for reflection, stay to form any definite idea of the 

 unperceived qualities. We act first as we should act if we 

 reasoned from our idea of them, but without forming that 

 idea. The educated perception itself discharges the appro- 

 priate reaction. Thus, the sight of a cab coming towards 

 me, as I cross the street, causes me to hurry out of its way. 

 The reason for hurrying may be formulated in the judg- 

 ment, <c at the speed at which that cab is coming, it will 

 overtake me ; " but if I stayed to form the judgment 

 before beginning to quicken my pace, I should probably be 

 run over. What really happens is that the sight of the 

 cab discharges the motion without the aid of any reflection. 

 And this is due to the action of previous experiences of 

 cabs and other moving bodies which have incorporated 

 themselves in the perception. The perception has assimi- 

 lated them. The experiences have endowed it with a 

 power of awaking reactions which they have shown to be 

 appropriate. 



If it be replied that nevertheless ideas played their part 

 in this training of the perceptions, the rejoinder is that 

 the part played by ideas is seldom if ever exhaustive. 

 Mill's case of the dyer who could not communicate his art 

 is but one instance out of many. I remember an excellent 

 but uneducated Cornish cook who, if asked how much of 

 a given ingredient she had put into a successful dish, 

 would reply, " Well, as much as I thought." Her per- 

 ceptions had become insensibly adjusted to her require- 

 ments, her ideas lagged far behind. Indeed, relatively to 

 j I perceptions, ideas are of a more reflective character, and 

 II like all that is reflective, they follow and but imperfectly 

 ^interpret their material. 



I 9. We have seen that in human psychology " crude " 

 /sensation and feeling belong to the sphere of hereditary re- 

 j sponse. That is, they may appear as the psychical side of 

 I responses made by preformed structure to stimulus. The 

 account now given of the earliest operations of experience 



