146 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



the passage of the two ideas so united before conscious- 

 ness. If it is argued, for contentious purposes, that mere 

 sequence of ideas in a continuous consciousness involves a 

 kind of relation, it must be replied that even so, this rela- 

 tion is not necessarily grasped by that consciousness. It 

 would be truer to the facts to urge that the relation between 

 juxtaposed elements of consciousness is apprehended with 

 varying degrees of distinctness, and if this view be adopted, 

 we may apply the term Associated ideas to the limiting 

 case in which this apprehension disappears, and the term 

 Judgment to the case where two or more elements are 

 definitely held together in some distinctive relation, making 

 of them a whole with a character of its own. 



c. The Practical Judgment. 



Except in one point, the Judgment as thus defined is 

 identical with the Judgment of Logic. In Logic, the term 

 is best reserved for such assertions as may be expressed 

 without modification in a proposition, that is, in words. 1 

 But, as we shall see more fully later, the rendering 

 of a synthesis in words is a distinct and separate 

 act from that of forming the synthesis itself. A child 

 may be aware that fire is a bright object that 

 burns, without being able to form or even to under- 

 stand the words. Just as I may feel or see without 

 naming, perhaps without being able to name what I was 

 feeling or seeing, so I may retain the memory of what I 

 have felt or seen without the aid of language, and the same 

 thing applies to the relation, say, of co-existence or sequence 

 between what I felt and saw. This relation is one thing, 

 its verbal expression another, involving, as we shall see 

 later, a distinct act of correlation. Concrete experience and 

 the practical thinking in which it is reproduced are so far 

 from being dependent on language that to the end they 

 cannot in all their individuality and detail be adequately 

 expressed in language. The proofs of this will, I hope, 

 accumulate as we go on. Meanwhile, we need a term to 



1 This, at least, seems to correspond best to general usage. See the 

 writer's Theory of Knowledge, p. 122. I need not here enter into the 

 question whether there is synthesis in every logical judgment a point 

 which I have discussed in the same work, pp. 149-153. 



