vin PRACTICAL JUDGMENT 147 



distinguish a synthesis of experiences in which language is 

 not used from the logical judgment. Such a synthesis will 

 deal with the particular objects and events of experience, 1 

 and its purpose will be to guide action in relation thereto. 

 We may therefore call it Practical Judgment. 2 



II. fhe Conditions of the Practical Judgment in Experience. 



2. a. Concrete experience. 



The character of the Practical Judgment depends in the 

 last resort upon the experience on which it rests. In the 

 lower stage of Intelligence the experience throughout was 

 of a sensori-motor character. There was a sense-excitement 

 giving rise to a reaction, followed by a feeling, and the 

 feeling in turn had a motor effect. What followed was a 

 modified reaction, explained in popular language as due 

 to a "revival" of the feeling, or, at least, of the motor 

 impulse belonging to it. Postponing for a moment further 

 analysis of this explanation, let us first observe that the 

 formation of j udgments rests on a more concrete or articu- 

 late form of experience. Suppose that we have an appre- 

 hension of concrete objects with their parts and qualities, 

 their actions and changes, and suppose this apprehension to 

 be " revived " (as the feeling impulse was revived), then 

 we have in our revived experiences wholes consisting of 

 distinguishable parts that is, a synthesis of elements that 

 remain distinct that is the content we require for our 

 "practical judgment." Perception as we know it in our- 

 selves is complex and continuous. As we look at a house, 

 walls, windows, and chimneys appear, forming distinct 

 elements which are yet united in one whole. As we attend 

 to a series of events, listen to a speech, or watch a cricket 

 match, a continuous stream of perceptions, distinct and yet 

 connected, passes through our consciousness. When we 

 bring analysis to bear on the total impression made in 



1 For if the elements of the synthesis are recognised as general, the 

 conditions of language are at once present. See below, Chap. XIV., 

 p. 321, etc. 



1 It should be noted that the limiting adjective, "practical," has been 

 applied to animal intelligence in a somewhat different sense by other 

 writers. Thus, the late Dr. Mivart (On Truth, p. 345) speaks of animals 

 as drawing " practical inferences," and these appear to be identical with 

 his "sensuous inferences" (p. 145) which correspond rather with the 

 Association of Ideas than with the " Practical Judgment " of the text. 



L 2 



