148 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



either case, it reveals an order in the experience, a relation 

 between part and part, which contributes as much to the 

 total impression as the parts themselves. This relation 

 analysis can dissect out and in a sense treat as independent 

 of the terms which enter into it. But just because this is 

 the work of analysis, it leads to conception, not merely 

 to perception. What analysis reveals, however, is that, 

 without being dissected out, the relations go to constitute 

 perception, and are thus as truly parts of what is perceived 

 as the terms that they unite. What is perceived is a 

 complex of distinct but related parts. Such a complex is 

 what we call articulate, and the terms-in-relation which 

 it comprises may be called a perceptual relation, as 

 against the conceptual relation which is held apart from 

 its terms. 



Let us now suppose a mind endowed with perceptions 

 of this concrete kind, and with the power of reproducing 

 them ideally in relation to a present perception. Thus, 

 seeing one side of the house, I can mentally affix the 

 unseen sides to that which I see, and recollecting, for 

 example, on which side the door is, can direct my steps 

 accordingly. Here the relations of unseen parts to one 

 another and to what is seen are grasped, as before in 

 perception, so now in idea, and this is what I mean by the 

 Practical Judgment. It is more than Assimilation, because 

 what is revived is an idea, a definite reference to something 

 unperceived. It is more than Association, because the 

 relation between the u revived " idea and the given per- 

 ception is an essential part of it, and it is less than analytic 

 thought, because the relations involved are not dissected 

 out as distinct elements in consciousness. 



b. Revival. 



But we cannot pass on without dwelling on the Law of 

 Revival (or Association, or Redintegration, as it is variously 

 called). The broad facts, whether in this or the lower 

 stage, are the same. There are certain experiences, A, B, c, 

 contemporaneous or following in continuity one upon the 

 other. Let A arise again, from whatever cause, and we 

 say that it tends to " revive " B and c. What is the 

 character of this revival ? Let us first remove a mis- 



