vin PRACTICAL JUDGMENT 149 



understanding so gross that it should never have arisen. 

 Neither the A nor- the B nor the c of the new case is 

 identical with the original A, B, and c. A state of 

 consciousness, having once been, is gone. It has no sub- 

 stantial existence, as it were underground, from which it 

 may be brought up again. When we speak of reviving B, 

 we mean at most a state B.,, similar to an original B^ An 

 ordinary understanding of the English language ought to 

 prevent any mistakes on this head. 



But now comes the real difficulty. What is revived is, 

 after all, not B 2 something exactly like B! but, say, b, 

 something partially like B I} but modified in some respects. 

 What is the nature or the condition of this modification ? 

 In the lower stage, taking the simplest case where an 

 inhibitory movement p is revived, there is this important 

 difference from the original. In the first experience we 

 have s R p p sensation, reaction, pain, recoil. The 

 recoil or inhibitory movement is separated by two links 

 from the original stimulus. If when "revived" it remained 

 so separated, it would be too late to effect anything. In 

 being revived, it is also brought forward in time. At the 

 same time, the original tendency R begins to drop out. 

 Hence we really have not revival but modification. The 

 conative excitement originated by s, which gave us R, is 

 corrected, it may be reversed, into a different form of ex- 

 citement, giving us p. In our experience the modification 

 goes right back to the initial step of the process. The sight 

 which has disgusting associations becomes itself disgusting. 



Now if we turn to the revival of concrete ex- 

 perience we shall again find that what appears to be 

 " revived " is really brought up in quite a new form. 

 After the experience of A B c, A may be said to 

 " revive " B and c, but this does not mean that the per- 

 ception of A revives the perception of B and c, but the 

 ideas of them. In many cases and there is reason for 

 thinking that these cases are of the original type A 

 excites an anticipation (or memory) of B and c. To 

 understand this, let us first remember that things and 

 events are not isolated, but connected, so that we should 

 symbolise the original experience not as A, B, c, but as 



