vni PRACTICAL JUDGMENT 151 



this condition determines its change of character. The 

 Practical Judgment " revives" experience only in the same 

 loose sense in which it is revived in Assimilation. The 

 judgment which we refer to a past perception as its cause 

 is not itself a perception, but is an assertion about things 

 that are not perceived. In the case of the Practical 

 Judgment, it is an assertion of things that have been or 

 will be, an assertion bringing them into relation with what 

 is perceived. The experience on which this judgment is 

 founded differs from the experience of the lower stage. 

 For in the lower stage, Sensations (i) have no apparent 

 function unless they excite a motor reaction, and (2) 

 coalesce in subsequent experience with the feelings which 

 modify them. In the experiences underlying the practical 

 judgment, a sensation not itself moving a reaction may 

 have a function as initiating ideas, which perhaps at several 

 removes determine conduct. While secondly, it is the 

 main point on which we have insisted that each element 

 is kept distinct from the others that it calls up. In the 

 lower stage it is merely necessary that there should be 

 sense-experiences affecting the mind so as to dispose it to 

 action. In the higher stage, there is perception of the 

 surrounding world of objects in their manifold relations, 

 changes, etc. Lastly, it will readily appear that in this 

 concrete experience, any one element is a centre of many 

 relations. A perceived object is associated not merely 

 with some feeling, but with many other objects perceived 

 at the same time. Any one of these it may suggest, 

 according as a subsequent purpose marks out the lines of 

 interest, and hence, as we shall find, " revival " in this 

 stage is no longer necessarily dominated by association, 

 but is free to supply means to ends as circumstances 

 require. 



3. c. Ideas. 



The pivot upon which the practical judgment turns, as 

 our account has shown, is the formation of the idea. 



c, but A may be gone before c has come. This, of course, occurs in any 

 long train of thought. Further, as experience grows more complex, and 

 its results frequently conflict, beliefs are often depressed into mere sug- 

 gestions or thoughts of reality. We then have " association of ideas " as 

 ordinarily conceived. 



