158 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



To sum up. In the sphere of articulate experience, a 

 very few impressions, often a single impression, will suffice 

 to form a permanent basis for memory. Where the con- 

 nection of elements is not apprehended, memory rests 

 either (i) on frequent repetition, or (2) on the excitement 

 of strong feeling. This second influence can only extend 

 to experiences bordering closely in time upon the moment 

 of feeling. In association each link normally recalls that 

 which immediately follows, but it also has a weak tendency 

 to recall remoter experiences. To bear these points in 

 mind will give us some help in deciding how to class some 

 of the examples of the use of experience which we shall 

 meet. 



III. tfhe products and application of the Practical 'Judg- 

 ment. 



4. a. Knowledge of objects. 1 



From what has been said of concrete experience and its 

 revival, it follows that in this stage the mind may without 

 impropriety be said not merely to react appropriately to 

 objects, but to have a certain knowledge of them. This 

 knowledge must indeed fall short of the conceptual under- 

 standing whereby the characters of perceived objects fall 

 into their place in a system of thought. But still it may 

 be called knowledge of an object as a whole consisting of 

 distinct parts. Such knowledge is not yielded by Assimi- 

 lation alone, for here, beyond the quality perceived by the 



power is, however, materially lower than that of normal association, 

 and it diminishes rapidly as the links omitted are increased. (For 

 the evidence see Ebbinghaus, op. cit. pp. 130, ff., and M tiller and 

 Schumann, p. 307.) It results that between experiences separated by an 

 interval of time the associational tie, if there is any, must be relatively 

 weak. 



Lastly, reversed associations are not impossible. If a series of names 

 is learnt, we all know that we can with difficulty repeat them in reverse 

 order. The observations of Miiller and Schumann, however, suggest that 

 this can only happen where the previous name or syllable forms one 

 complex state of consciousness with the later one which " revives" it. If 

 two syllables were grouped, they formed a well-marked backward associa- 

 tion, but as between separate impressions they failed to establish the 

 process with certainty (op. cit. p. 308). It is safe to say that if association 

 in this form is possible without the aid of articulate recollection /.<?., 

 remembrance of relations between elements its effect is relatively feeble. 



1 The term is here used not in the general sense of " object of thought 

 or of consciousness," but rather in the popular sense of a material thing 

 with a certain individuality. An animal would be an object in this sense. 



