vin PRACTICAL JUDGMENT 159 



sense organ, we have no definite reference to other 

 characters of the object. It is not yielded by the Asso- 

 ciation of ideas. To know an orange is not merely to 

 associate a certain colour with a certain shape, smell, 

 weight, softness, taste, and so forth. If we use the word 

 associate at all, we must qualify it by adding " in certain 

 defined relations to one another." To know that this is 

 an orange is to know that what I see before me will, 

 if I put it to my nose, emit a certain scent, if I 

 put my teeth into it as it is, will be unpleasantly bitter, 

 but if I first peel it, will reveal a pleasing juicy pulp, and 

 so forth. In other words, the common object, to become 

 known as an object, must be understood as a kind of 

 structure involving related elements. In the same way, 

 my knowledge of a house is not a mere association of one 

 room with another, but a knowledge of the relations of the 

 rooms, etc., in space. While even with regard to a series 

 of events, though association without synthesis } might 

 reproduce the ideas in an order corresponding to that in 

 which the events occurred, my knowledge of the events as 

 a series must imply that two or more of them are held 

 together in their relations. 



b. Memory and Anticipation. 



It thus appears that knowledge of objects, and other 

 persons or animals, knowledge of localities, and knowledge 

 of occurrences depend on a more or less developed power 

 of grasping the elements of experience in their mutual 

 relations. From this again it will be seen that both 

 Expectation and Memory, in the stricter sense of those 

 terms, rest upon the same basis. In a loose sense the 

 term memory is often used to describe such permanent 

 influence of experience as is present in the lowest stages of 

 assimilation, but this is a misnomer which confuses things 

 essentially distinct. What operates in assimilation we 

 should call retentiveness, for something is, even in that 



1 Such a synthesis, as I have argued elsewhere, may be given in appre- 

 hension in the simpler cases where it unites two immediately sensible 

 qualities through their coexistence in one point of space at one moment. 

 Beyond this, and thus in every case where the behaviour of an object at 

 different times enters into one conception of it, the synthesis acts by 

 bringing into relation contents of distinct perceptions. 



