160 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



stage, retained, and revived in relation to the present. 

 But suppose that what is " retained " is a series of events 

 grasped as a series, and that this series is revived in relation 

 to present perception as its first step. We then have 

 anticipation or expectation of the coming events. If 

 again any connected series is grasped as a whole, there 

 may at the end be retention in idea of the earlier stages. 

 Such a mental reference to an experience that is past 

 constitutes the memory-judgment in its primitive form. 

 What is remembered or expected must be placed in 

 some more or less defined relation to ourselves at the 

 present moment, and conversely, where such an act of 

 mental reference to past or future is possible, there are the 

 conditions for the judgments of memory or expectation. 



c. Purpose. 



With the power of anticipation arises for the first time 

 the possibility of purposive action in the strict sense. The 

 paradox of organic action is that it carries out apparent 

 purposes without purposing to do so. That is to say, it is 

 adapted to the securing of results which we as spectators 

 recognise as valuable to the organism, and yet we do not 

 imagine it to be determined by any conception of those 

 results. Just as the general bodily structure of a plant or 

 an animal is adapted to meet the broad requirements of its 

 mode of life, so its hereditary modes of reaction are so 

 directed that while each is called up from hour to hour by 

 its appropriate stimulus, and only by that stimulus, the 

 result is to serve and to maintain the type of life peculiar 

 to the species. The ordinary healthy animal does not eat 

 in order to support life, but because it is hungry. It does 

 not seek its mate in order to propagate the species, but in 

 obedience to the sexual impulse. If the term " purposive " 

 is claimed for these impulses on the ground that they are 

 determined by the efforts which follow from them, the 

 reply is that this is not literally true. There is a relation, 

 but it is of a very indirect and circuitous kind. In the 

 individual animal, under the sway of instinct, the impulse 

 that appears purposive say, the impulse to seize and 

 devour its prey is determined not by prevision of 

 the beneficial effects of eating, but immediately by its 



