1 66 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



is met in the human world by a formulation of the end 

 to which one is impelled, along with its relation to the 

 surrounding circumstances. The formulation of the end 

 j constitutes an Idea, and the impulse so qualified becomes 

 la Desire. In the animal world, though we know nothing 

 i of what passes in an animal's consciousness, we must yet, 

 \if we find action similarly determined, impute to the 

 animal something which, if not an idea, is capable of per- 

 forming an identical function. If ideas arise in this way 

 as a definition of impulse, it is easy to understand that 

 they carry a motor excitement with them. Action 

 would seem to be the primitive and natural accom- 

 paniment of an idea, and it is only in the course of 

 further evolution that ideas arise which do not prompt 

 to action. 



5. f. Knowledge of Objects and Analogy. 

 Two further points remain in which the application of 

 concrete experience is contrasted with habituatton. First, 

 since perception yields knowledge of objects as wholes 

 containing related elements, it makes possible inferences 

 concerning objects which are similar as wholes, that is in 

 the arrangement of their parts rather than in any special 

 sense-quality. Inferences of this character seem to underlie 

 much of our practical thinking about the common objects 

 of life. We may be at a loss to name any single important 

 sense-quality in which, say, two animals resemble each 

 other ; and yet we are sure that there is a real identity of 

 character which will make them for many purposes act 

 alike. Such an inference, drawn, as it continually is, with- 

 out any analytical reflection, is the rudest form of analogy, 

 being based on what are really similarities of relation. 

 Such similarities may appear as an influence in practical 

 inference as soon as wholes of related elements are dis- 

 tinctly experienced that is to say, as soon as we attain to 

 knowledge of concrete objects ; and unless there is such 

 knowledge, it is hard to see on what such an inference 

 could rest. Hence, conversely, inference based on such a 

 similarity as distinguished from identity of sense-quality 

 may be taken as evidence that experience is of the concrete 

 type. 



