i yo MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



perience of relations which should be distinguished. In 

 the first, a relation between A and B affects the mind 

 though A and B are never apprehended as related. This 

 is the case of assimilation where, e.g., a feeling modifies 

 the effect of a sensation, though the sequence sensation- 

 feeling is never grasped. In the third and highest, the 

 relation a between the two terms A B is distinguished, 

 named, and compared with others. Thus in the same 

 instance the relation is known as one of sequence, 

 perhaps as one of causation. Here there is knowledge 

 of the relation as such, and we are in the world of 

 " universals " or general conceptions. In the second 

 and intermediate stage the relation is not apprehended 

 as such, but the terms in their relation are grasped 

 together. The datum of experience is here the content 

 A B. In our instance the whole proceeding, feeling- 

 following-on-sensation, is apprehended, though the relation 

 of sequence is not dissected out and so prepared for 

 naming and comparison with others. This I call the 

 stage of Concrete Experience and the Practical Judgment, 

 and its unit is an articulate complex in the perceptual 

 order. 



Apart from introspection, we may justly impute this 

 knowledge of objects in relation when we find action 

 based on the relation A B as distinct from the contents 

 A, or B, alone. The marks distinguishing action of such 

 a character have been enumerated above. 



V. 'The Practical Judgment as a stage in the Correlation 

 of Experiences. 



7. It remains to characterise in general terms the 

 Method and Scope of the correlation effected in this stage, 



distinguished from the terms which compose it. When I look at any 

 complex object, as, e.g., the front of a house, I am aware of a whole with 

 many distinct parts. These parts are in definite relations to one another. 

 I may concentrate attention on any pair ; e.g., a window to the right of the 

 door. I then not merely see the door and window, but see them in their 

 relation to one another. By an act of analysis I can go further, and 

 make of the relation a distinct object of thought, independent of the 

 terms which it connects in this particular case. But in so doing I pass 

 from perception to conception. When I speak of a relation as perceptual, 

 or even as " perceived," I mean that it is not thus distinguished, but is 

 an element in a perceived whole. 



