x SOME EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 235 



perceptual basis, and is capable of being brought into 

 relation with another such idea, for example, as means 

 to end. 1 



Absence of analysis. 



At the same time it must be understood that, if we 

 attribute ideas to an animal, they are not ideas arrived at 

 by any breaking-up, analysis, or other elaboration of what 

 is given in perception. None of my animals (with the 

 possible exception now and again of the monkeys) showed 

 the least understanding of the how or why of their 

 actions, as distinct from the crude fact that to do such 

 and such a thing produced the result they required. It is 

 this want of what one may call analysis that made, for 

 example, the push-back bolt such a difficulty. What 

 Jack or the elephant knew was, crudely, that they had to 

 push this bolt. That the reason why they had to push it 

 was to get it clear of the staple they obviously never 

 grasped. 2 



Similarly, Jack learnt to push a door, but which side he 

 was to push it he did not know. Clearly he did not 

 realise that to push the door would pull the string, and so 

 drag down the card. All he knew was that a push on 

 either side might get him the meat. 3 If, then, positively, 



1 The practical ideas which I would attribute to animals, therefore, 

 correspond with the explicit ideas of Dr. Stout. Ideas in Dr. Stout's 

 terminology may be either tied, explicit, or free. Tied ideas are those 

 "complicated" with perception, the elements which, in the terminology 

 here used, have been assimilated by a sense datum. They are not 

 separable elements in a mental state (Manual, pp. 191 following). 

 Explicit ideas " extend and supplement present sense perception." 

 Such an idea is a distinguishable element in consciousness but it does 

 not arise except in relation to a percept (p. 196). Free ideas, on the 

 other hand, have an individuality of their own and can exist apart 

 from that which originally revives them (ibid.}. Explicit ideas corre- 

 spond precisely to those which I impute to the stage of the practical 

 judgment. Free ideas, I think, belong only to that more reflective 

 consciousness which we presume to be the exclusive attribute of 

 man. 



2 It may have been mere chance, but I did observe the monkey Jimmy 

 at times fingering the space between the two staples. Here at least was 

 a datum out of which understanding of the bolt might come. 



3 I therefore fully agree with Mr. Small's meaning, though I should 

 employ a slightly different terminology, when he says : " It is also clear, 

 I think, that, what properly may be called ideas, find slight place in the 

 associative process. Crass images visual, olfactory, motor organic 

 conditions, and instinctive activities are assuredly the main elements. 



