xi KNOWLEDGE OF CONCRETE OBJECTS 263 



that it perceives changes in outer objects, and bases its 

 action thereupon, or adapts it to the production of such 

 changes as it desires. It appears to be guided not only by 

 the simple resemblances of sense-qualities, but by the 

 similarities of relation which constitute the bond of 

 identity between complex objects. And now, lastly, we 

 have seen that it is not tied to one uniform type of 

 reaction in response to a perceived object, but forms its 

 behaviour in accordance with the relation in which the 

 object stands to the goal of its desire for the moment. 



4. d. The application of experience. 



These results are corroborated by observers who report 

 cases in which the behaviour of an animal is devised to 

 meet the behaviour which he has learnt to expect from 

 other animals, or from men. 



In these cases, the experience may be said to be applied 

 with a certain amount of originality, which puts the 

 behaviour observed out of the category of habituation. 

 A certain event is anticipated, and, without instruction or 

 suggestion, preparation is made to meet it. Or, perhaps, 

 a situation has been found advantageous, and a spontaneous 

 effort is made to bring such a situation into being again. 

 Or, lastly, unique circumstances occur, in which knowledge 

 is applied in a manner appropriate to those circumstances 

 alone. In all of these cases, we have behaviour indicating 

 not merely knowledge of objects, but also power of 

 applying that knowledge with a certain spontaneity. 

 Now, are these cases authentic ? Does such behaviour 

 exist ? I know of no experimental evidence of it below 

 the level of monkeys. 1 There is, however, a considerable 

 body of casual observation, 2 tending to show that be- 



1 The evidence with regard to monkeys will be referred to in the next 

 chapter. By experimental evidence I mean cases in which the circum- 

 stances and antecedents of the act have been systematically traced. 



Mr. Cole's raccoons (cited by Jennings. Animal Behaviour American 

 Nattiralist, March, 1908, pp. 213, 214) afford an exception to the remark 

 in the text. They learned not only to react to signals (as described above, 

 p. 243), but to claw them up themselves. They could not see which they 

 were getting up beforehand, but if the red one came up, which was wrong, 

 they clawed it down again, raised the green one and prepared to receive 

 food. 



2 The value of evidence of this kind is briefly considered in Chapter 

 XII., p. 296 et seq. 



