xi KNOWLEDGE OF CONCRETE OBJECTS 267 



go to and fro between the table and his master, inviting 

 him by mines persuasives to come to the joint feast. 

 Every one knows, or ought to know, that cat. 



Closely connected with these are the many instances of 

 apparent deceit which give animal psychologists some 

 trouble to explain. 1 It is not necessary to suppose that an 

 animal thinks out a lie, as a deliberately treacherous 

 human being would do ; but an animal does know what it 

 is told to do and what it is forbidden to do. It knows 

 what the consequences of disobedience will be ; and it 

 knows when its master's eye is on it, and when it is not. 

 If it is very acute, it may further recognise some of the 

 signs by which its master will gather what it has done in 

 his absence ; and it may seek to remove them. All this 

 follows very simply from the attribution to an animal of a 

 judgment based on experience as to the way in which its 

 master will behave. No higher faculty is required, but 

 we cannot, unless we wholly reject or painfully distort 

 evidence of the kind under consideration, do with any- 

 thing lower. 



The distinctive feature of the cases dealt with in this 

 section is that if they are correctly reported and inter- 

 preted, they are cases of the application of experience with 

 a certain originality or spontaneity. In its lowest form, 

 the application of experience is not distinguishable from 

 its acquisition. Habit is built up out of action, or the 

 refraining from action ; and it issues in similar actions or 

 similar retrainings. The formation of the habit is the 

 tendency to act (or refrain). Nothing need be added to 

 the habit in order to produce the action. In the higher 

 forms of experience, there is a change in this point. Ex- 

 perience is acquired in order that it may be used in practice, 

 but its acquisition and its application fall apart into two 

 clearly distinguishable acts. In its most elementary form, 

 this distinction appears even in cases of learning by direct 

 perception of results. An animal desiring B, observes 



1 For instances, see Schneider, p. 355 ; K. and O. M tiller, p. 13, 

 and Lloyd Morgan, Comparative Psychology, p. 371 (The story of 

 the Maltese terrier which was supposed to dance round the table on 

 two legs ; but dropped on to four at the end where it could not be 

 seen.) 



