294 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



might get near enough to it for a spring. I doubt 

 whether Jimmy's state of mind can, with due allowance 

 for the facts, be reasonably analysed into simpler terms 

 than these ; and the use of these terms clearly implies 

 both an " original " application of experience, and a fairly 

 complex adjustment of one consideration to another. 



ii. 1 have imputed cc practical ideas " to animals lower 

 than the monkeys, to express the fact that they not merely 

 respond in a uniform manner to a certain physical situation, 

 but appear to direct their actions to the production of a 

 certain physical change. Keeping to the same terminology, 

 I should say that what distinguishes the ideas of monkeys 

 from those of other animals in so far as experiments like 

 mine can measure them, is an increase in elaboration and 

 articulateness. By increased elaboration, I mean that in 

 experiments of this kind, the monkey is less the slave of 

 the perceptual order. There is more work of the mind in 

 the plans which he lays on the basis of his experience. 

 And this is principally shown in the increased articulateness 

 of the plan itself. The monkey can apply one object to 

 another ; that is why he can use a stick, a stool, a poker. 1 

 It may be said, so could the dog, if he had a hand. I am 

 not prepared to deny this hypothetical statement ; but I 

 would rejoin that if the dog had a hand, his intelligence 

 would be developed in a different way. He has not the 

 empirical data at the disposal of the monkey ; and there- 

 fore, in experiments of the kind which one can institute in 

 a house or a laboratory, experiments depending principally 

 upon the manipulation of objects, the ape appears head 

 and shoulders above other animals. Whether we speak of 

 ideas or not, we cannot refuse to allow to the ape actions 



1 The reasons why animals do not use tools are partly physical, partly 

 mental, and the two reasons are correlated. The use of tools implies a 

 certain articulateness of ideas the grasping of different objects in rela- 

 tions not given by perception. This articulateness again implies a power 

 of tactual discrimination only to be gained by the use of the hand. Hence 

 the employment of tools is almost unknown below the apes, and rare 

 among them. Of the making of a tool, I only know one authentic 

 instance. A chimpanzee formerly at Belle Vue would not only pick the 

 key of its cage out of a bunch, but could make itself a key out of a piece 

 of wood. This is less marvellous than it sounds. The key was a simple 

 square (like a railway key), and the monkey had only to bite the wood 

 till it would fit into the square hole. 



