302 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 



12. The question with which we set out at Chapter VII. 

 was, whether the second grade of intelligence was 

 realised in the animal world. That grade of intelligence we 

 called the grade of Concrete Experience and the Practical 

 Judgment. It was marked by the appearance of several 

 functions in close interconnection. The primary function 

 is that of concrete experience itself; i.e., the power of per- 

 ceiving surrounding objects or passing events as wholes of 

 distinguishable parts. Where such an experience exists, 

 and is "reproducible " in the form of ideas guiding action, 

 we have all the characteristics of the second stage. We 

 have memory, in the form of the idea of a past event ; 

 anticipation, in the form of an idea of something about 

 to come attached to present circumstances through the 

 relation suggested from the past. Anticipation, with the 

 impulse to avoid or attain, is again Desire. Where there 

 is desire, i.e., the idea of the end, there may also be an 

 idea of the means, and choice of means with a view to the 

 end. Such a choice from the material presented by re- 

 produced experience, is the Practical Judgment. Lastly, 

 out of the combined results of perceptions and the concrete 

 ideas reproduced in connection with them, is built up the 

 knowledge of individuals, localities, and the whole concrete 

 surroundings of the organism : surroundings including a 

 multitude of related facts, any one of which relations is at 

 the disposal of the practical judgment to serve its ends. 



p. 368), which could not lift its ball out of a hole, and butted down the 

 side so that he could roll it up, was perhaps less intelligent than it looked. 

 To us it was converting a perpendicular wall into an inclined plane. To 

 its own consciousness perhaps it was merely butting away an obstacle. 



Lastly, one impulse impinging on another may result in a happy com- 

 promise by which both are satisfied in the manner discussed in relation 

 to instinctive adjustments (above, Ch. VI). 



It remains that in many of these cases, we must end for the present 

 with a confession of ignorance. We cannot understand them until more 

 is known of the whole life and character of the animals concerned. What 

 is important for the present is that we should not impute a knowledge of 

 the relation of means and ends unless we see action resulting from an 

 experience of that relation, and then only under the conditions and with 

 the limitations that have been discussed in the last two chapters. 



