xin SOCIAL INSTINCTS 315 



has frequently the external character of an act of 

 sympathy, forbearance, courage, self-restraint. The 

 question whether these terms are rightly applicable 

 depends on the question, how much the animals know 

 of what they are about. If we decide to apply them, we 

 do not mean that animals act in obedience to any 

 conception of right or any principle of duty. We mean 

 in final analysis this that the apparent end of the 

 " social " action for the sake of which we human beings 

 give it its name and assign its character is also its real 

 end. This end of course is concrete and particular, not 

 abstract and universal. The animal shows sympathy not 

 because sympathy is a virtue, but because it sympathises. 

 On the other hand, the show of sympathy is not merely 

 an inherited or habitual method of reaction to a certain 

 kind of stimulus. It is not merely an unthinking 

 response to the cry of a hungry animal or the sight of 

 one that is in distress. It is directed to the relief of the 

 distress, and guided accordingly by what is required 

 therefor. The little monkey, famous through Darwin's 

 description, that rescued its keeper, is justly called brave, 

 for it knew the danger, and overcame its fear. Such 

 bravery requires no knowledge of general principles to 

 make it admirable. 



We move in this matter between two sources of fallacy. 

 If we say that consciousness of its purpose is not necessary 

 to make an act praiseworthy, we end by making praise 

 and blame meaningless. If we praise a fly for the 

 unselfishness which it shows in providing for young which 

 it will never see, and of which it cannot be supposed to 

 have the most rudimentary idea 1 we must end by 

 lauding the self-sacrifice of the microbe which ends its 

 own existence by splitting into two or four young 

 microbes. What an excess of parental devotion ! May 

 we not even, while we are about it, call it rather devotion 

 to the welfare of the species and the interests of posterity ? 

 Clearly the purpose must govern praise and blame, or the 

 attribution of any of those qualities which carry a note 

 of praise or blame. We must not go by the result which 

 1 See Weir, The Dawn of Reason, p. 104. 



