CHAP, xiv THE CONCEPT 319 



But it cannot describe what it does to us, nor, so far 

 as we know, to another individual of its own species. In 

 many respects, a child of three shows less practical 

 capacity and intelligence than a dog, but it has one great 

 advantage : that it can describe what it is doing, or what 

 it wants, and can learn to do fresh things, not only by 

 imitation, but by having them explained to it. Now, the 

 description of a concrete fact or action proceeds, as we all 

 know, by combinations of simple words each expressing a 

 general idea. The free use of language supposes a stock 

 of general ideas, and description of particular facts is a 

 means whereby those facts are brought into relation with 

 the store of ideas. It is in the existence of such a store 

 at its disposal for use in practice that human intelligence 

 is broadly distinguished from that of the highest animals. 



If we grant the highest animals concrete experience, the 

 power of grasping perceived relations and applying them 

 afresh to new and different circumstances, we grant, I 

 believe, enough to explain the most intelligent action 

 which can be attributed to them on any substantial 

 authority. Caution, cunning, and sagacity of the kind of 

 which " animal stories " are so full do not as a rule imply 

 anything more or less than the " concrete experience " 

 that we have described. How much readiness may be 

 shown in the use of past experience, how much cleverness 

 'and originality in the adaptation of means to ends, is a 

 question purely of degree. How much of these qualities 

 we are to grant to animals is a question of fact. The 

 evidence by which it is to be decided is at present in a 

 very unsatisfactory condition. But the same general 

 powers with which we have credited the higher animals 

 would explain alleged instances of sagacity and cunning 

 which one would certainly not rely upon to prove the 

 possession of such powers. Nor by going further in this 

 direction, and attributing to animals more of the kind of 

 intelligence in question, do we bring them sensibly nearer 

 to the distinctively human intelligence the specific character 

 of which consists, as we have hinted, in a distinct method 

 of organising or correlating its experiences. 



To take an illustration. I have referred to the chim- 



