322 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



some conception of the class, a conception operating 

 independently of present perception, were already formed, 

 and expressed by a class name. This brings us to the, 

 first stage in the formation of language. The process 

 of naming implies, first, that the common elements in 

 different experiences are attended to. There is not very 

 much in this as it stands, because in the lowest types of 

 inference, the common element in different cases is what 

 is operative. If a child calls out " Mam-mie " at sight 

 of its mother, this is a simple reaction to a familiar 

 percept not differing in principle from other reactions, 

 such as that of running towards the mother, or smiling in 

 response to her. The action of the common character or 

 the " universal " is no peculiarity of human intelligence. 

 It begins with intelligence itself. 



What is new is perhaps better seen when we turn to 

 the second element in the use of language. If language 

 consisted of baby talk of exclamations Dad-da ! Gee-gee ! 

 Puff-puff ! at the sight of the appropriate objects it would 

 not serve as a basis of communication. Baby talk in its 

 first stage has only an element of language, viz., the word. 

 It is ^ second stage, and in the case of infantile de- 

 velopment distinctly later and more difficult to com- 

 ^pass, when distinct words are put together, especially 

 when they are put together to express something which 

 is not present to perception. When this can be done, 

 even in the simplest way, it shows that ideas can be 

 detached from their context, and pieced together newly. 

 Even in the narration of an event, this is true of the 

 hearer, though not perhaps necessarily of the narrator. 

 When a child of two comes in and relates some little 

 event of its walk, it may be regarded as merely reviving 

 the impression. But when the child itself understands a 

 story, the higher stage is clearly reached. The different 

 words must each carry a meaning. It is the word which 

 gives rise to the idea, which must therefore be independent 

 of perception. If the monkey could communicate the 

 secret of the key, not only would it have to possess a set 

 of terms to express each point in the description, but the 

 other monkeys would have to be endowed with an intel- 



