340 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



" sentiment " that elsewhere he disparages. Between his 

 home and his business there is probably the ultimate bond 

 of connection that the one is maintained by the other, but 

 this does not mean that the principles or ideas of the one 

 in any great degree dominate the details of the other. 

 Practically a man's action in any capacity is guided mainly 

 not by what he is in other respects, but by what he is in 

 that capacity. 



What is true of self-knowledge applies of course equally 

 to self-interest. The self-interest which guides a man's 

 action can only be the interest of the self as the man con- 

 ceives it at the time. A man might act in the interest of 

 his true self, if he knew his true self. But for practical 

 purposes " enlightened self-interest " ordinarily means the 

 subordination of momentary considerations to the broad 

 ends or the general plan by which a man is dominated in 

 one or other of his different capacities. It seems necessary 

 to say this much in order to avoid exaggerating the co- 

 ordination of conduct which the conception of the self may 

 be held to introduce into life. In its theoretical complete- 

 ness, enlightened self-interest would mean the subordination 

 of each action to the whole system of purposes that make 

 up the self. This would also of course involve that the 

 experiences and the impulses of the personality were brought 

 into a system. To understand how far self-knowledge 

 would take us in the intelligent co-ordination of action, we 

 may usefully throw this ideal or " limiting conception" 

 into contrast with the fragmentary co-ordinations of the 

 " practical judgment." Here there is combination of 

 means to an immediate end. There may even be the 

 preference of one u end " over another, as when a dog, 

 after wavering between the principles of obedience and the 

 impulse to hunt, comes at last reluctantly to his master's 

 call. In this case of " self-control " we see the dog's per- 

 manent habits overcoming a momentary impulse based on 

 a deep-seated instinct, and we might say without much 

 straining that the dog's " truer nature," founded on his 

 fidelity, conquers the mutinous impulse which threatens its 

 harmony. But it would be a long step from this admission 

 to the suggestion that the dog on his part has any concept 



