352 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



than to suppose that she originally accepted the attentions 

 of her mate with a view to maintaining the numbers of 

 the species. In this grade, it is only so far as action is 

 instinctive that its ends are broad and permanent. So far 

 as it is intelligent and based on experience, its aims are 

 near and concrete. Obviously, this limitation of view 

 must apply to social action in this grade. 



Now the characteristic of human intelligence as we have 

 defined it is that it widens out so as to grasp the permanent 

 in experience, and comprehend life in some sort as a 

 whole. Thus widened, the same impulses that we saw 

 before in the narrow concrete sphere develop into the 

 manifold relations of personality. Sympathy, for example, 

 becomes a regard not merely for the immediate needs, but 

 for the career, the character, the mental development of 

 another. The hen that clucks to her chick, and the 

 mother that plans out a child's education with a view to 

 physical health, growth of character, and the profession 

 that must be taken up twenty years hence, are both 

 moved by the parental impulse, but there is a difference in 

 comprehensiveness of aim. Conversely, in the same way, 

 we can conceive an animal a sentinel deer, for example 

 performing the service immediately necessary for its 

 herd. We can hardly conceive it as having the good of 

 the herd as a permanent object of action. Animals may 

 have selfish impulses, that is, desires for their own 

 gratification as opposed to that of another. Man alone is 

 swayed by self-interest ; that is, an intelligent subordina- 

 tion of desire to his permanent welfare as he conceives it. 

 And just as his own permanent welfare becomes an end to 

 him, so in proportion to his moral qualities does the 

 permanent welfare of other people. It is in this way that 

 the social qualities of animals are transformed in becoming 

 human. 



7. Morality is not ordinarily conceived as consisting in 

 the devotion to certain broad and comprehensive purposes 

 so much as in conforming to certain rules. Without in- 

 quiring here how far this conception is adequate, we may 

 point out that the mass of rules, traditions, customs, laws, 

 moral judgments, religious conceptions, which make up the 



