xv CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT 353 



accepted code of conduct in any society, naturally subserve 

 the broad end of the maintenance of that social system on 

 which they are dependent. They are the media axiomata 

 by which conduct is brought into relation to the broad 

 requirements of the welfare, or, at lowest, the maintenance 

 of society. Ordinary unreflecting morality is therefore 

 conduct adjusted to the maintenance of the existing social 

 type. It stands at a lower grade than the conduct delib- 

 erately regulated by some general principle, but in several 

 respects at a higher grade than the highest development of 

 the "Practical Judgment." For to begin with, though a 

 rule may not be referred back to the principle which under- 

 lies and justifies it, it is still a rule, still general ; that is to 

 say, it is as such independent of impulse, and dependent on 

 a general conception recognised not only by the agent, but 

 by onlookers. In other words, it is a standard of conduct. 

 Thus it becomes relatively independent of the caprice of 

 the individual and the whim of the moment. The social 

 sanction is there to guide the errant individual, and the 

 moral sanction the man's permanent conception of him- 

 self to check the errant whim. To illustrate by a single 

 point : the difference is that between an act of kindness 

 based on an impulse of sympathy or affection, and an act 

 of justice, based on an acknowledged duty or right. It is 

 proverbially easier to be generous or kind than to be just; 

 and the reason is, that while kindness springs from an 

 impulse which its object, from whatever cause, happens to 

 have excited, justice is required, whether the impulse is 

 there or not. Such a requirement can only be fulfilled 

 where there is the recognition of a universal law applying 

 under specified conditions to all individuals, and under all 

 circumstances, without reference to the feelings or desires 

 of the agent. Thus with the apprehension of general 

 rules, social relations cease to rest merely upon instinct 

 and impulse, and pass instead into a system of acknow- 

 ledged rights and duties. 



Two corollaries follow from the standardising of conduct. 

 One is the possibility of adapting conduct to a highly 

 complex social structure. Of this something has already 

 been said. The other is, that while social behaviour be- 



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