xvi SYSTEMATIC THOUGHT 379 



hand, or to the desires of the moment on the other, but 

 are embodied in general rules forming a permanent standard 

 which society itself will enforce. In this formulation of 

 the general rules of action prescribed by the conditions of 

 life, and particularly of social life, we find the foundation 

 of human moral systems. 



It follows that effective moral theory is broadly relative 

 to the practical exigencies of the existing social structure. 

 Now the existing social structure rests on a very partial 

 application of that principle of a common human nature to 

 which it owes its existence. In primitive life, societies are 

 small, and often, particularly among the more vigorous 

 stocks, mutually hostile. The common interest which 

 unites the men of group A makes them collectively hostile 

 to group B. Nor is this all. The relations within any single 

 group are by no means dominated by the social principle 

 to the exclusion of any other. The actual structure of 

 any society is a kind of compromise between the claims of 

 self assertion and the recognition of what is due from man 

 to man. The pure social principle would demand the 

 suppression of every instinct of antagonism and personal 

 aggrandisement. Effectively recognised morality has 

 never demanded anything of the kind. It recognises 

 self-assertion, rivalry, competition, and antagonism, within 

 their limits, and seeks so to adjust them that they shall 

 not be destructive of the social order. The social princi- 

 ple is, as it were, Society's collective instinct of self-pre- 

 servation, and it reduces the other instincts to order as 

 best it may, but its original aim is not to conquer but to 

 compromise with them. It is at a later stage, when 

 the social principle has become more explicitly realised, 

 that there arises a moral theory going beyond actual 

 morality. Hence also comes about a divorce between the 

 moral ideal, or religion and philosophy on the one hand, 

 and the effective morality which is the generalised 

 expression of customary conduct and the recognised 

 requirements of social life, on the other. We are told, 

 for example, to love our enemies, but the primitive man, 

 and we are all primitive men when it comes to the point, 

 loves his friends and hates his enemies, and his conceptions 



