. 



402 MIND IN EVOLUTION CHAP. 



the perception proper becomes disengaged from the motor 

 impulse, so extending its scope and becoming a perceptual 

 judgment. 1 Such a perceptual complex when freely 

 reproducible, becomes the basis of the recognition of 

 individual objects, persons, and places, and of the 

 succession of events. Action is now no longer tied to a 

 specific motor stimulus, but is based on a relation whereby 

 means and end are connected. 



We have called this the stage of Concrete Experience 

 and of the Practical Judgment. The correlation which it 

 effects is a degree more complex than that of the preceding 

 stage. Its terms are themselves complexes of related 

 elements. In the percept-complex which forms the 

 starting point, experiences which are distinct are already 

 combined to form a whole. The adjustment of means to 

 ends is again, as we have understood it, a distinct act of 

 correlation, and the one relation is based on the other. 

 We may express this increased complexity by describing 

 this stage as the correlation of interrelated elements or 

 Articulate Complexes, the one complex being perceptual, 

 the other practical. Both are essentially concrete, that is 

 to say, we deal in this stage not with the relation as such, 

 but with two or more related objects of experience. From 

 this it follows that while the " particular " relations are 

 "conscious" or "explicit," the "universal " that connects 

 them operates unconsciously. In a given case a conse- 

 quence is anticipated on the basis of a parallel experience, 

 but there is no consciousness of the implied generalisation, 

 nor even an analysis revealing the point of identity as 

 against the individual differences between the two cases. 

 The inferential process involved is thus parallel to the 

 argument from particulars to particulars, or, if we regard 

 the application of experience alone, to an argument from 

 minor premiss to conclusion. In this argument the major 

 premiss is not an explicit object of consciousness, but is 



1 In sensori-motor action we already have a certain correlation of 

 distinct elements. But this correlation is purely subservient to the motor 

 response. We have no evidence of the apprehension of the complex as a 

 distinct state until we find it "reproduced" in an idea. We may there- 

 fore speak of perception in relation to sensori-motor activity but not of 

 the perceptual judgment. 



