26 THE SCIENCE OF THE FUTURE : 



all that we can say is, " I feel like that." In fact, all the propositions of 

 Geometry are nothing but the analysis and elaborate expression, so to 

 speak, of these primary convictions and the Geometry-structure stands 

 and falls with them. There is no such thing as intellectual truth that 

 is, I mean, a truth which can be stated as existing apart from feeling. If, 

 for instance, a proposition in Geometry can be really shown to be based 

 on the axioms, it is true, not intellectually or absolutely, but as an ex- 

 pression of my primary Geometrical sense ; and if my giving a few pence 

 to a crossing sweeper is based not on a mere impression of duty, or an 

 anxiety to appear charitable, or wish to escape his importunity, but on 

 genuine regard for the man, then it is true, not in any absolute significa- 

 tion, but just as an expression of what it professes to represent namely 

 my primary sense of humanity. Indeed the truest truth is that which is 

 the expression of the deepest feeling, and if there is an absolute truth it 

 can only be known and expressed by him who has the absolute feeling or 

 Being within himself. 



This being so and the nature of the intellectual processes being, like 

 the links in a chain, transitional it becomes obvious that the intellectual 

 results may figure as a means but never as an end in themselves. To hang 

 any weight of reliance on them in the latter sense is like the Chinese 

 Trick described by Marco Polo of throwing a rope's end up in the air 

 and then climbing up the rope. Hence it appears that our scientific 

 theories, are perfectly legitimate as long as they are formed as a means 

 towards practical applications. In that sense they are transitional ; they 

 are formed not as substantial truths but merely as links in a chain towards 

 some definite practical result. For this purpose we may form whatever 

 theories are convenient : if we are calculating the strength of bridges, we 

 may adopt what generalisations we like concerning mechanical structure, 

 as long as they give us actual and practical results ; if we are predicting 

 eclipses, we may make use of any theory that will do. The theory does 

 not matter as long as it hauls the practical result after it, just as it does 

 not matter whether your cable is of iron or hemp or silk as long as you 

 can get your ship into dock with it. In this sense our Modern Science 

 is, I conceive, admirable. For practical results and brief predictions it 

 affords a quantity of useful generalisations shorthand notes and con- 

 ventional symbols and pocket summaries of phenomena which bear about 

 the same relation to the actual world that a map does to the country it is 

 supposed to represent. It cannot be said to have any resemblance to the 

 real thing but when you understand the principle on which it is formed 

 it is exceedingly useful for finding your way about. As long as Science 

 therefore keeps the practical end in view, and starting from sense seeks to 

 return to sense again, its intermediate theorising is perfectly legitimate ; 

 but the moment it credits its theory with a positive and authoritative exist- 

 ence, as an actual representation of facts and endeavors to pass by means 

 of it into unverifiable and abstract regions, as of invisible germs or atoms, 



