42 DEFENCE OF CRIMINALS: 



ent ages or parts of the world, but even at any one time among different 

 classes of the same society ? Must we conclude that there is no such 

 thing as a permanent moral code valid for all time ; or must we still sup- 

 pose that there is such a thing though society has hitherto sought for it 

 in vain ? 



I think it is obvious that there is no such thing as a permanent moral 

 code at any rate as applying to actions. Probably the respect or stigma 

 attaching to particular classes of actions arose from the fact that these 

 classes of actions were or were thought to be beneficial or injurious to 

 the society of the time ; but it is also clear that this good or bad name 

 once created clings to the action long after the action has ceased in the 

 course of social progress to be beneficial in the one case, or injurious in 

 the other ; and indeed long after the thinkers of the race have discovered 

 the discrepancy. And so in a short time arises a great confusion in the 

 popular mind between what is really good or evil for the race and what 

 is reputed to be so the bolder spirits who try to separate the two having 

 to atone for this confusion by their own martyrdom. It is also pretty 

 clear that the actions which are beneficial or injurious to the race must by 

 the nature of the case vary almost indefinitely with the changing condi- 

 tions of the life of the race what is beneficial in one age or under one 

 set of conditions being injurious in another age or under other circum- 

 stances so that a permanent or ever valid code of moral action is not a 

 thing to be expected, at any rate by those who regard morality as a result 

 of social experience, and as a matter of fact is not a thing that we find 

 existing. And, indeed, of those who regard morals as intuitive, there are 

 few who have thought about the matter who would be inclined to say that 

 any act in itself can be either right or wrong. Though there is a super- 

 ficial judgment of this kind, yet when the matter comes to be looked into, 

 the more general consent seems to be that the Tightness or wrongness is 

 in the motive. To kill (it is said) is not wrong, but to do so with mur- 

 derous intent is ; to take money out of another person's purse is in itself 

 neither moral nor immoral all depends upon whether permission has 

 been given, or on what the relations between the two persons are ; and 

 so on. Obviously there is no mere act which under given conditions may 

 not be justified, and equally obviously there is no mere act which under 

 given conditions may not become unjustifiable. To talk, therefore, about 

 virtues and vices as permanent and distinct classes of actions is illusory : 

 there is no such distinction, except so far as a. superficial and transient 

 public opinion creates it. The theatre of morality is in the passions, and 

 there are (it is said) virtuous and vicious passions eternally distinct from 

 each other. 



Here, then, we have abandoned the search for a permanent moral code 

 among the actions ; on the understanding that we are more likely to find 

 such a thing among the passions. And I think it would be generally 

 admitted that this is a move in the right direction. There are difficulties 



