PUBLIC LANDS. 167 



were in common. That primarily and originally all the peo- 

 ple who were upon the earth had an equal undivided right in 

 the earth and the things that were upon it. Some of these 

 things were by nature incapable of a property in them, that 

 is, of a dominion and ownership by one man, to the exclu- 

 sion of the rest ; — such as the ocean, the air, &c., these 

 must remain in common. Other things are capable of ex- 

 clusive property in an individual, as the earth. The original 

 community of goods in these things that were capable of 

 ownership would become, they say, inconvenient as mankind 

 increased and society progressed. Under this condition of 

 things, " the most effectual way," says Rutherford, "of secur- 

 ing the peace of mankind is by introducing an exclusive pro- 

 perty. * * * The common claim which all men origin- 

 ally had to all things is taken away by the introduction of 

 property as far as this exclusive right extends. * * * * 

 When mankind were few in number, and lived together in 

 the same place, they could easily meet to divide their com- 

 mon stock, and to assign to each other his proper share by 

 eccpress consent, agreement, 07' compact. But after their 

 numbers were increased, and they were settled in different 

 parts of the world, very distant from one another, it became 

 impossible for all of them to meet together. This method 

 therefore of introducing property by express consent was 

 rendered impracticable. Some consent, however, has been 

 shown to be necessary to make the introduction of property 

 consistent with justice ; and a tacit one would be sufficient 

 for that purpose. Such a tacit consent is called occupancy. 

 Indeed occupancy is but one part of the act." • The other 

 part of the act, as stated by Rutherford, is the consent of 

 the rest of mankind, and this consent is presumed if they do 

 not assert their common right and interfere with his occu- 

 pancy. 



