123 



upwards of 30,000 living in another, and appoint all 

 their ciiief officers executive and judiciary. From the 

 difference of their situation and circumstances, their 

 interests will often be very different. 



3. The senate is, by its constitution, too hoinogene- , 

 oils with the house of delegates. Being chosen by the ( 

 same electors, at the same time, and out of the same \ 

 subjects, the choice fails of course on men of the same / 

 description. The purpose of establishing different (i 

 houses of legislation is to introduce the influence of /| 

 different interests or different principles. Thus in ' 

 Great Britain it is said their constitution relies on the 

 house of commons for honesty, and the lords for wis- ,'/ 

 dom ; which would be a rational reliance if honesty 

 were to be bought with money, and if wisdom were 

 hereditary. In some of the American states the dele-- ' 

 gaters and senators are so chosen, as that the first re- 

 present the persons, and the second the property of the 

 state. But with us, wealth and wisdom have equal 

 chance for admission into both houses We do not 

 therefore derive from the separation of our legislature 

 into two houses, tliose benefits which a proper compli- 

 cation of principles is capable of producing, and those 

 which alone can compensate the evils which may be 

 produced by their dissensions. 



4. All the powers of government, legislative, execu- 

 tive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The 

 concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the 

 definition of despotic government. It will be no alle- 

 viation that these powers will be exercised by a plu- 

 rality of hands, and not by a single one. 173 despots 

 would surely be as o{)pressive as one. Let those who 

 doubt it turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As 

 little will it avail us that they are chosen by ourselves. 

 An elective despotism was not the government we fought {{ 

 for; but one which should not only be founded on free 

 principles, but in which the powers of government 

 should be so divided and balanced among several bodies 



of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their le- 

 gal limits, without being effectually checked and re« 



