On the Mechanical Conception of Nature. 695 



selection and the mechanical conception of nature, 

 for how can one and the same process be effected 

 simultaneously by necessity and by designing 

 powers ? The one excludes the other, and we 

 must so it appears take our stand either on 

 one side or the other. 



Nevertheless we cannot set aside Von Baer's 

 proposition without further examination simply 

 because it is apparently incapable of being ful- 

 filled, since it contains a truth which should not 

 be overlooked, even by those who uphold the 

 mechanical theory of nature. It is the same 

 truth which is also made use of by the philo- 

 sophical opponents of this theory, viz. that the 

 universe as a whole cannot be conceived as having 

 arisen from blind necessity that the endless 

 harmony revealed in every nook and corner by 

 all the phenomena of organic and of inorganic 

 nature cannot possibly be regarded as the work 

 of chance, but rather as the result of a " vast 

 designed process of development." It is also 

 quite correct when, in reply to the supposed ob- 

 jection that the mechanical theory of nature is 

 not concerned with chances but with necessities, 

 Von Baer answers that the operations of a series 

 of necessities which "are not connected together" 

 can only be termed accidents in their opposing 

 relations. He illustrates this by instancing a 

 target. If I hit the latter by a well-aimed shot, 

 nobody would explain this as the result of an 



