the Mechanical Conception of Nature. 709 



by utilizing physical necessities ; the farmer 

 accomplishes his purpose, that of obtaining a 

 crop of corn, by sowing the seed in suitable land, 

 but the seed must germinate as an absolute 

 necessity when exposed to the influences of 

 warmth, soil, moisture, &c. Thus, in these in- 

 stances a chain of necessities is undoubtedly 

 connected with a teleological force, the human 

 will ; and it directly follows from such cases that 

 wherever we see an aim or result attained through 

 necessities, the directive force does not interrupt 

 the course of the series of necessities which have 

 already commenced, but is active before the first 

 commencement of these necessities, since it com- 

 bines and sets the latter in movement. From the 

 moment when the mechanism of the watch is 

 combined harmoniously and the spring wound up, 

 it goes without the further interference of the 

 watchmaker, just as the corn-seed when once 

 placed in the earth develops into a plant without 

 assistance from the farmer. 



If we apply this argument to the development 

 of the organic world, those who defend mechanical 

 development will not be compelled to deny a 

 teleological power, only they would have with 

 Kant * to think of the latter in the only way in 

 which it can be conceived, viz. as a Final Cause. 



In the region of inorganic nature nobody any 



* [Eng. ed. See Kant's " ADgemeine Naturgeschichte und 

 Theorie des Himmels."] 



