On the Mechanical Conception of Nature. 713 



basis of matter and of the natural laws resident 

 therein, we thus reconcile the apparent contradic- 

 tion between the mechanical conception and teleo- 

 logy. In the same way that Von Hartmann, 

 somewhere speaks of the immanent teleology of a 

 machine, we might speak of the immanent teleo- 

 logy of the universe, because the single forces of 

 matter are so exactly adjusted that they must give 

 rise to the projected world, just as the wheels and 

 levers of a machine bring forth a required manu- 

 factured article. I admit that these are grossly 

 anthropomorphic ideas. But as mortals can we X. 

 have any other ideas ? Is not the notion of purpose 

 in itself an equally anthropomorphic one ? and is 

 there any certainty that the idea of causality is 

 less so ? Do we know that causality is unlimited, 

 or that it is universally valid ? In the absence of 

 this knowledge, should it not be permissible to 

 satisfy as far as we can the craving of the human 

 mind for a spiritual First Cause of the universe, by 

 speaking of it in terms conceivable to human 

 understanding? We can take up such a final 

 position and still be conscious that we thereby 

 form no certain conception, and indeed come no 

 nearer to the reality. The materialist still makes 

 use of the notion of " eternity," and frequently 

 handles it as though it were a perfectly known 

 quantity. We nevertheless do not seriously believe 

 that by the expression " eternal matter," any true 

 idea resulting from human experience is gained. 



