On the Mechanical Conception of Nature. 715 



have arisen." " It is impossible that from purely 

 external elements devoid of all internality (Inner- 

 lichkeif) there should suddenly appear, by a 

 certain mode of combination, an internality which 

 becomes more and more richly developed. The 

 more certainly science becomes convinced that in 

 the sphere of externality (Ausserlichkeit) the higher 

 (organic) phenomena are only results of combina- 

 tion, or are the aggregate phenomena of the 

 elementary atomic forces, the more surely, when 

 she once seriously concerns herself with this other 

 question, will she not fail to be convinced that the 

 sensibility possessed by higher stages of con- 

 sciousness can be only combination-results, or the 

 aggregate phenomena of the elementary sensations 

 of atoms, although these atomic sensations as 

 such always remain below the level of the higher 

 combinations of consciousness." In confusing 

 this double-sided nature of the objective pheno- 

 menon " lies the main error of all materialism and 

 of all subjective idealism. Just as the attempt of 

 the latter (subjective idealism) to construct the 

 external phenomena of existence in space out of 

 functions of internality and their combinations is 

 impossible, so is the endeavour of the former 

 (materialism) to build up internal sensation out of 

 any combinations of force acting externally in 

 space equally impossible." 



I have no intention of going any deeper into 

 these questions. I mention them only in order to 



3 A 



