CORRESPONDENCE, 1846-55. 195 



at least of them) are more like ordinary sentences involving a 1846. 

 syllogism. 



As to subjective and objective (I shall say ideal and objective, 

 as subject-ivQ will not do for logic) I see your difficulty, and must 

 consider whether I have not shown that I see it when the proof 

 sheet comes. I have a great fear of not using the word in the 

 sense of anybody else. The object itself, as far as we can think 

 of it, is the idea of an object. The first step I make is the exist- 

 ence of my own mind ; the next, that of other minds. If every- 

 thing in existence be a dream of my mind, a thing of which I 

 have ideal possibility, there are no objects. If you attempt to 

 argue me into belief of your existence and beat me (not argue 

 by beating me, which is the sort of argument by which Berkeley 

 has been answered before now), I may not be able to answer 

 you ; but all that is no more than might happen in my dream. 

 I might sleep, as it is, and dream that I was arguing with some- 

 body who proved to me most satisfactorily that I was awake. 

 But getting by the argument of analogy the existence of other 

 minds, I then begin to know objects other minds get the same 

 as I get, from somewhere. A source of ideas to more minds 

 than one, or to all minds under the same circumstances, would 

 be what I should call my definition of an external object, if, 

 unfortunately, an external object under the same circumstances did 

 not imply objects already. Call it then a test of objects ; material 

 or not, is of no consequence. Hence the idea of external objects. 



By the idea I merely mean that which is in the mind. I 

 should distinguish a horse in the mind from that which is in the 

 mind about from whence a horse comes into the mind; idea of 

 mental state produced, and idea of producing external cause ; 

 idea of idea, and idea of object. When I speak objectively, I refer 

 to my idea of the object ; when ideally, to my idea of the idea. 



But should not objects be divided into external and internal ? 

 What am I to call an idea, looked at as presenting me with the 

 idea of itself ? I talked of the idea of a horse ; I spoke then of 

 my mind in the state of looking at itself picturing a horse ; 

 another mind would have done. 



All this, I believe, is common enough. I have put it down 

 that you may see how far our language agrees. Now as to my 

 paper, pray observe that my notion, if such must be inferred 

 of the case of the words subjective and objective, refers to the 

 case in which all they have to do with formal Logic is stated. 

 And my paper is wholly on formal Logic. The writers on this 



o 2 



