CORRESPONDENCE, 1846-55. 199 



only one matter in which the facts, in the most objective sense, 1846. 

 come out differently with me from other people. The Biog. 

 Brit, says (copied by Brewster) that Whiston says that Newton 

 was so offended by being represented as an Arian, that he 

 therefore refused W. admission into the Royal Society. Refer- 

 ence is made to the edition of W.'s memoirs of 1753, which 

 bibliographers know to contain addit ions. This edition is scarce, 

 but on consulting it, I find that the representation is an absolute 

 falsification ; for W. gives the same reason as in the edition of 

 1749, which has nothing to do with any ism at all, or arian either. 

 Sir D. Brewster has had a lucky escape. It was by mere 

 accident I looked at the Biog. Brit., a work which I never trust 

 in the life of Newton. He gives the same account, with the 

 same reference, without saying he has taken it from anywhere 

 else. Had I not happened to have found his source, I should 

 have left him to clear himself by confessing copying without 

 verification, or otherwise at his discretion. This failing of copy- 

 ing references without acknowledgment has cost me hundreds 

 of hours uselessly employed. 



Now to enunciation. We must define. If I carry a mes- 

 sage out of my mind into yours, and you receive it, and know 

 that I meant to send it, and if, moreover, I did mean to send it 

 I certainly enunciate, if the etymology be to give the meaning. 

 But if logical enunciation in pure form be required, there 

 must be subject, predicate, and copula (is or is not), all duly 

 announced. 



According to Aristotle there must be in enunciation either 

 truth or falsehood. Thus prayer, he says, is not enunciation. 

 I say there is truth or falsehood, may be either. 



Are we on a question of definition of words, or on one of 

 separation of things ? If I shut up my window, meaning to 

 have you believe I am out, I enunciate ' A. De Morgan is not at 

 home ; ' not verbally, if by enunciation is meant what I call 

 verbal enunciation. So if I know you to be searching for, say 

 your hat, and I point to the chair on which it lies, I do not say, 

 1 Your hat is on that chair,' but I convey, or mean to convey, 

 the message to your mind. If I were to chalk an X on the 

 great gate at Trinity, meaning to charge the management 

 with peculation, and if others so understood it, the Judge would 

 leave it to the jury to say whether both facts were proved, 

 my intention and others' reception. If they were satisfied on 



