200 MEMOIR OF AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN. 



1846. these points, he would instruct them that the X was a libel, and 

 would leave them to find damages accordingly. 



There is no doubt that in law the enunciation of a libel is 

 wholly independent of the symbols used. The rule of law is 

 very distinct; writing, signs, pictures, &c., are equally libels, 

 when intention is proved ; and in the civil matter the law 

 decides, not the jury, whether the matter is libellous. 



The message intended, and received as intended, constitute 

 with me enunciation. If others object to the word, I must 

 choose another word ; but this is the thing I mean. Provided 

 always that there is in reality subject, predicate, and copula. 

 Whether message intended but not received is enunciation, that 

 is, whether the difference should not have been a distinctive 

 term, is matter of convenience. If I understood Arabic, to make 

 what the French call a fiere supposition, and thinking you did, 

 wrote you ^_ ^ ^ jj or whatever it might be (if more dots 

 are wanted pray stick 'em in), and if you did not understand it, 

 there might well be a word to denote this imperfect message. 



If I were only to raise an image or single idea, not affirma- 

 tion of agreement or disagreement as, if I were merely to call 

 your attention by uttering the single word book, apropos of 

 nothing, I could not be said to enunciate. If yon took it as my 

 saying, ' It is my pleasure to say a word, viz. book,' you take 

 an enunciation. If that were what I meant, the enunciation 

 is perfect. But if I meant nothing but to set you wondering 

 what I meant, there would be nothing going between us. This 

 mere utterance would, I suppose, be the Xoyos o-^/xavn/cos of Aris- 

 totle, as distinguished from the aTro^avrtKo?. What I contend 

 for is, that that which is absolutely considered semantic may be 

 apophantic by the understanding of the parties. 



I do not see how ' A is B ' is in any other way more apo- 

 phantic than -* > which is no enunciation to you, but for 

 what you know may be to another. This is enunciation to me 



L >-^j- 



and to all who understand Mavor's short-hand. If prayer be 

 not enunciation, as Aristotle says it is not, how does the other 

 party know it is prayer ? Does not the pray-er say I pray 

 this? 



I have got some further development of my Logic in definite 

 syllogisms, derived from the classification in my last ; with some 

 curious entrance of a principle corresponding to that of like 



