316 MEMOIR OF AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN. 



1863, and was another then he would be very much inclined to 

 doubt the difference of balls, when the only difference is that of 

 place. 



This supposes a faculty altogether beyond our comprehen- 

 sion if, indeed, anything be within our comprehension on the 

 question of what is what which ties spaces together, just as 

 memcry ties times together. 



All this I found in Kant (Hey wood, ut supra, p. 109). He 

 uses it to prove, as he thinks, that ego ' I think ' might be iden- 

 tical, though the thinking subject is variable. He will not 

 admit the space-string to constitute the nos of different places 

 one ego. I cannot find any of this in Hey wood's or Tissot's 

 translations, and I think it possible that he may have learnt 

 better in the interval of the editions. But you may be able to 

 refer me to some notice of it. 



With this metaphysical reduction of omnipresence to depend 

 upon an incomprehensible something which has at least an 

 analogue in our own consciousness, I have looked for ten years 

 at various ontological writings about ' the unconditioned,' and 

 various religious works about ' the Almighty,' and I think I see 

 a very great tendency to confuse omnipresent personality with 

 infinite extent. At least there is a want of power to put the 

 distinction into language. 



Are you aware of any Roman Catholic speculation on the 

 subject ? They must give mnltipresence to the saints whom 

 they invoke, and by whom they expect to be heard. And I 

 should suppose that some of their writers have touched on this 

 gift. 



I am now writing on the subject of Infinity, trying to burn 

 the candle at both ends. I have found out for some years that I 

 am a full believer in the infinitely great and small, both . I mean 

 in the subjective reality of both notions. 



I cleared off much obscurity by a distinction which I find 

 very faintly shadowed by the psychologists that of a concept 

 which has image, and a concept which has none. I can image a 

 horse : I can't image the right to a horse, but I can conceive it. 

 I cannot image infinity, but I can conceive it that is, 1 recog- 

 nise a notion ivith predicates. So that when a metaphysical 

 writer says, as some have said, that we cannot conceive space to 

 be finite, and are equally unable to conceive it as infinite, I say 

 they ought to have said that we cannot conceive space to be 

 finite, nor image it as infinite. But neither can we image a 



