Cooperation 155 



When there is actual competition among the purchas- 

 ing agencies, the dairyman may receive a fair price for 

 the milk. In practice, however, the producer is almost 

 wholly at the mercy of the milk dealers, who become suf- 

 ficiently powerful to dictate the price which shall be paid 

 to the producer as well as the price which the consumer 

 shall pay. In some of the cities, the milk dealers have 

 formed combinations which have been shown to operate 

 as a restraint of trade and as a monopoly in the milk 

 traffic of the community. Neither the individual pro- 

 ducer nor the individual consumer can protect himself 

 against a combination of this character. In New York 

 City, for example, the dealers who control the milk supply 

 have been able to force the price of milk which the pro- 

 ducers were paid down to or even below the cost of pro- 

 duction. They have also from time to time through 

 mutual agreement simultaneously raised the price of 

 milk to the consumer and have coerced the independent 

 dealers by selling milk to their customers at a lower price 

 than the independent dealers received for the milk. 

 Through the evolution of the milk-distributing business, 

 the city milk dealers have acquired a position of virtual 

 monopoly. This condition has in the past been so in- 

 tolerable that many producers have abandoned the pro- 

 duction of milk, and the state has found it necessary to 

 bring action under the anti-monopoly laws against the 

 middlemen to protect both the producer and the consumer 

 alike against their unreasonable abuses. In the face of 

 this condition, whereby competition has been eliminated 

 among the milk dealers, there are two ways in which the 

 interests of the public may be protected. The first is 



