174 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



is given, and I am convinced that none can be given, for 

 the assertion that dream-objects are not " there " and 

 not " given." Let us take the second point first. 



(1) The belief that dream-objects are not given comes, 

 I think, from failure to distinguish, as regards waking 

 life, between the sense-datum and the corresponding 

 " thing." In dreams, there is no such corresponding 

 " thing " as the dreamer supposes ; if, therefore, the 

 "thing" were given in waking life, as e.g. Meinong 

 maintains, 1 then there would be a difference in respect of 

 givenness between dreams and waking life. But if, as 

 we have maintained, what is given is never the thing, but 

 merely one of the " sensibilia " which compose the thing, 

 then what we apprehend in a dream is just as much given 

 as what we apprehend in waking life. 



Exactly the same argument applies as to the dream- 

 objects being " there." They have their position in the 

 private space of the perspective of the dreamer ; where 

 they fail is in their correlation with other private spaces 

 and therefore with perspective space. But in the only 

 sense in which " there " can be a datum, they are " there " 

 just as truly as any of the sense-data of waking life. 



(2) The conception of " illusion "or " unreality," and 

 the correlative conception of "reality," are generally 

 used in a way which embodies profound logical con- 

 fusions. Words that go in pairs, such as " real " and 

 "unreal," "existent" and "non-existent," "valid" 

 and "invalid," etc., are all derived from the one funda- 

 mental pair, "true" and "false." Now "true" and 

 " false " are applicable only except in derivative signifi- 

 cationsto propositions. Thus wherever the above pairs 

 can be significantly applied, we must be dealing either 

 with propositions or with such incomplete phrases as 



1 Die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens, p. 28. 



