190 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



an act of will and its fulfilment. But obviously the sort 

 of nexus desired between cause and effect is such as could 

 only hold between the "events" which the supposed 

 law of causality contemplates ; the laws which replace 

 causality in such a science as physics leave no room for 

 any two events between which a nexus could be sought. 



(3) " The cause compels the effect in some sense in 

 which the effect does not compel the cause." This belief 

 seems largely operative in the dislike of determinism ; 

 but, as a matter of fact, it is connected with our second 

 maxim, and falls as soon as that is abandoned. We may 

 define " compulsion " as follows : " Any set of circum- 

 stances is said to compel A when A desires to do some- 

 thing which the circumstances prevent, or to abstain 

 from something which the circumstances cause." This 

 presupposes that some meaning has been found for the 

 word " cause " a point to which I shall return later. 

 What I want to make clear at present is that compulsion 

 is a very complex notion, involving thwarted desire. So 

 long as a person does what he wishes to do, there is no 

 compulsion, however much his wishes may be calculable 

 by the help of earlier events. And where desire does not 

 come in, there can be no question of compulsion. Hence 

 it is, in general, misleading to regard the cause as com- 

 pelling the effect. 



A vaguer form of the same fnaxim substitutes the word 

 " determine " for the word " compel " ; we are told that 

 the cause determines the effect in a sense in which the 

 effect does not determine the cause. It is not quite clear 

 what is meant by " determining " ; the only precise 

 sense, so far as I know, is that of a function or one-many 

 relation. If we admit plurality of causes, but not of 

 effects, that is, if we suppose that, given the cause, the 

 effect must be such and such, but, given the effect, the 



