KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 217 



same entity, in spite of not being acquainted with the 

 entity in question. 



When we, who did not know Bismarck, make a judg- 

 ment about him, the description in our minds will probably 

 be some more or less vague mass of historical knowledge 

 far more, in most cases, than is required to identify 

 him. But, for the sake of illustration, let us assume that 

 we think of him as " the first Chancellor of the German 

 Empire." Here all the words are abstract except " Ger- 

 man." The word " German " will again have different 

 meanings for different people. To some it will recall 

 travels in Germany, to some the look of Germany on the 

 map, and so on. But if we are to obtain a description 

 which we know to be applicable, we shall be compelled, 

 at some point, to bring in a reference to a particular with 

 which we are acquainted. Such reference is involved in 

 any mention of past, present, and future (as opposed to 

 definite dates), or of here and there, or of what others 

 have told us. Thus it would seem that, in some way or 

 other, a description known to be applicable to a particular 

 must involve some reference to a particular with which 

 we are acquainted, if our knowledge about the thing 

 described is not to be merely what follows logically from 

 the description. For example, "the most long-lived of 

 men " is a description which must apply to some man, 

 but we can make no judgments concerning this man 

 which involve knowledge about him beyond what the 

 description gives. If, however, we say, " the first 

 Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplo- 

 matist," we can only be assured of the truth of our 

 judgment in virtue of something with which we are 

 acquainted usually a testimony heard or read. Con- 

 sidered psychologically, apart from the information we 

 convey to others, apart from the fact about the actual 



