KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 219 



It will be seen that there are various stages in the 

 removal from acquaintance with particulars : there is 

 Bismarck to people who knew him, Bismarck to those 

 who only know of him through history, the man with the 

 iron mask, the longest-lived of men. These are progres- 

 sively further removed from acquaintance with particulars, 

 and there is a similar hierarchy in the region of universals. 

 Many universals, like many particulars, are only known 

 to us by description. But here, as in the case of particu- 

 lars, knowledge concerning what is known by description 

 is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is 

 known by acquaintance. 



The fundamental epistemological principle in the 

 analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this : 

 Every proposition which we can understand must be com- 

 posed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. 

 From what has been said already, it will be plain why I 

 advocate this principle, and how I propose to meet the 

 case of propositions which at first sight contravene it. 

 Let us begin with the reasons for supposing the principle 

 true. 



The chief reason for supposing the principle true is 

 that it seems scarcely possible to believe that we can 

 make a judgment or entertain a supposition without 

 knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing 

 about. If we make a judgment about (say) Julius Caesar, 

 it is plain that the actual person who was Julius Caesar is 

 not a constituent of the judgment. But before going 

 further, it may be well to explain what I mean when I 

 say that this or that is a constituent of a judgment, or of 

 a proposition which we understand. To begin with 

 judgments : a judgment, as an occurrence, I take to be 

 a relation of a mind to several entities, namely, the 

 entities which compose what is judged. If, e.g. I judge 



