KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 223 



to discover the meaning of a judgment nominally about 

 him, I am not saying that we must substitute an idea. 

 Suppose our description is " the man whose name was 

 Julius Ccesar." Let our judgment be " Julius Caesar was 

 assassinated." Then it becomes "the man whose name 

 was Julius Casar was assassinated." Here Julius Ccesar 

 is a noise or shape with which we are acquainted, and all 

 the other constituents of the judgment (neglecting the 

 tense in " was ") are concepts with which we are ac- 

 quainted. Thus our judgment is wholly reduced to con- 

 stituents with which we are acquainted, but Julius Caesar 

 himself has ceased to be a constituent of our judgment. 

 This, however, requires a proviso, to be further explained 

 shortly, namely, that " the man whose name was Julius 

 Casar " must not, as a whole, be a constituent of our 

 judgment, that is to say, this phrase must not, as a whole, 

 have a meaning which enters into the judgment. Any 

 right analysis of the judgment, therefore, must break up 

 this phrase, and not treat it as a subordinate complex 

 which is part of the judgment. The judgment " the man 

 whose name was Julius Ceesar was assassinated " may 

 be interpreted as meaning " one and only one man was 

 called Julius Ceesar, and that one was assassinated." 

 Here it is plain that there is no constituent corresponding 

 to the phrase " the man whose name was Julius Casar." 

 Thus there is no reason to regard this phrase as expressing 

 a constituent of the judgment, and we have seen that this 

 phrase must be broken up if we are to be acquainted with 

 all the constituents of the judgment. This conclusion, 

 which we have reached from considerations concerned 

 with the theory of knowledge, is also forced upon us by 

 logical considerations, which must now be briefly re- 

 viewed. 

 It is common to distinguish two aspects, meaning and 



