KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 227 



author of Waverley," the meaning of " the author of 

 Waverley " is relevant to our assertion. For if the 

 denotation alone were relevant, any other phrase with 

 the same denotation would give the same proposition. 

 Thus " Scott is the author of Marmion " would be the 

 same proposition as " Scott is the author of Waverley." 

 But this is plainly not the case, since from the first we 

 learn that Scott wrote Marmion and from the second we 

 learn that he wrote Waverley, but the first tells us 

 nothing about Waverley and the second nothing about 

 Marmion. Hence the meaning of " the author of Waver- 

 ley," as opposed to the denotation, is certainly relevant 

 to " Scott is the author of Waverley." 



We have thus agreed that " the author of Waverley " 

 is not a mere name, and that its meaning is relevant in 

 propositions in which it occurs. Thus if we are to say, as 

 Miss Jones does, that " Scott is the author of Waverley " 

 asserts an identity of denotation, we must regard the 

 denotation of " the author of Waverley " as the denota- 

 tion of what is meant by " the author of Waverley." Let 

 us call the meaning of " the author of Waverley " M. 

 Thus M is what " the author of Waverley " means. Then 

 we are to suppose that " Scott is the author of Waverley " 

 means " Scott is the denotation of M." But here we are 

 explaining our proposition by another of the same form, 

 and thus we have made no progress towards a real 

 explanation. " The denotation of M," like " the author 

 of Waverley," has both meaning and denotation, on the 

 theory we are examining. If we call its meaning M', our 

 proposition becomes " Scott is the denotation of M'." 

 But this leads at once to an endless regress. Thus the 

 attempt to regard our proposition as asserting identity 

 of denotation breaks down, and it becomes imperative 

 to find some other analysis. When this analysis has been 



