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so-and-so " will remain true or remain false if we sub- 

 stitute a for " the so-and-so," where a is the denotation 

 of " the so-and-so." Such propositions will also remain 

 true or remain false if we substitute for " the so-and-so " 

 any other phrase having the same denotation. Hence, 

 as practical men, we become interested in the denotation 

 more than in the description, since the denotation decides 

 as to the truth or falsehood of so many statements in 

 which the description occurs. Moreover, as we saw 

 earlier in considering the relations of description and 

 acquaintance, we often wish to reach the denotation, and 

 are only hindered by lack of acquaintance : in such cases 

 the description is merely the means we employ to get as 

 near as possible to the denotation. Hence it naturally 

 comes to be supposed that the denotation is part of the 

 proposition in which the description occurs. But we 

 have seen, both on logical and on epistemological grounds, 

 that this is an error. The actual object (if any) which is 

 the denotation is not (unless it is explicitly mentioned) a 

 constituent of propositions in which descriptions occur ; 

 and this is the reason why, in order to understand such 

 propositions, we need acquaintance with the constituents 

 of the description, but do not need acquaintance with its 

 denotation. The first result of analysis, when applied to 

 propositions whose grammatical subject is " the so-and- 

 so," is to substitute a variable as subject ; i.e. we obtain 

 a proposition of the form : " There is something which 

 alone is so-and-so, and that something is such-and-such." 

 The further analysis of propositions concerning " the so- 

 and-so " is thus merged in the problem of the nature of 

 the variable, i.e. of the meanings of some, any, and all. 

 This is a difficult problem, concerning which I do not 

 intend to say anything at present. 



To sum up our whole discussion : We began by dis- 



