THE PROBLEM OF BODY AND MIND 251 



themselves. What the ' identity hypothesis ' or correlation 

 theory postulates is not an unknown X, but an imperfectly 

 known organism, whose pre-avvareness of meaning is as real 

 as its flesh-and-blood metabolism, yet inseparable from it. 



(4) Another objection to the * double-aspect ' interpreta- 

 tion is that we know ourselves as self-determining for no 

 one can get away from an immediate awareness of his per- 

 sonal agency whereas the organism is determined from 

 without, being part of the mechanical system of things. Can 

 the same reality be determined from without and self-de- 

 termining? But the objection must be disallowed, first be- 

 cause the organism has spontaneity, from the Amoeba up- 

 wards, and is certainly not wholly determined from without ; 

 and, second, because when we examine ourselves carefully 

 we find that our mental life is not wholly self-determined. 

 It is an unnecessary difficulty to say that one aspect is 

 teleological and the other mechanical ; for we have given 

 good reasons for believing that the organism is more than 

 mechanical. ' Body ' and ' mind ' are both of the teleological 

 or purposive type, for that is the nature of the creature from 

 first to last. 



5. Monistic Speculation along the Line of the Double- 

 Aspect or Correlation Theory. 



On the Double-Aspect or Identity Hypothesis all animals 

 are psycho-physical beings, and this is borne out by what is 

 known of the behaviour of the very simplest, for we see 

 Amoebae going ahunting and Foraminifera working like 

 selective artificers. But what of the plant world ? Logically, 

 we can make no halt, and there are curious phenomena which 

 approach behaviour in carnivorous plants and climbing 

 plants. In some cases, there is what looks like memory. 



