S4?6 MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF 



upon, is far short of that experienced with the aid of the external 

 senses. In diseased states of brain, the feeling, however, is as 

 strong as before ; as well as where a large portion, but not the 

 whole, of the brain is torpid, or, in other words, a large number 

 of faculties are inactive, and not merely inactive, but roused to 

 full action with difficulty, as in dreaming. The insane and the 

 dreamer, from the powerful action of parts only of the brain, have 

 as strong impressions as though they were employing their ex- 

 ternal senses. 



Any feeling or train of feelings may be thus renewed ; a string 

 of words be conceived, though perhaps, at the time, neither 

 heard, spoken, nor written, or even a train of thought. Whether 

 a former impression is directly excited from without, as it was 

 at first, and recognised ; or whether feelings of any kind are re- 

 excited from merely internal or indirect external causes of excite- 

 ment, and recognised ; or whether the impression of the former 

 occurrence of any feeling is renewed ; in all these cases of 

 memory, or perhaps more properly, in regard to the two first 

 instances, recognition, the matter is precisely the same. 



The mere recurrence of former impressions, without regard to 

 their recognition, is termed imagination or fancy : and innume- 

 rable combinations of past impressions may occur, in such form 

 and order as they did not occur before ; and it is to this, strictly, 

 that the term imagination or fancy is generally applied. 



Feelings thus re-excited, whether intellectual or moral, do not 

 start up insulated, but draw forth one another in association 

 just as they previously occurred in combination or in succession. 

 An odour will re-excite the idea of the place where such an 

 odour was vividly perceived; and all the circumstances and 

 occurrences of the place will present themselves to the mind in 

 succession or conjunction. It is thus that language spoken and 

 written is an instrument of connection. Any connection between 

 two feelings, of any kind whatever, serves this purpose ; and every 

 faculty may be thus excited ; and the excitement of the very 

 propensities excites ideas connected with the propensity, and the 

 excitement of any one faculty may excite another. 



While any feeling takes the lead, we are said to attend to it. 

 We can for a time keep it steadily vivid. This power is called 

 attention. The lowest animal can attend to its sensations, just as 

 the greatest philosopher to his profoundest thoughts* We cannot 

 call up a thought or feeling at pleasure ; but, by keeping vividly 



