THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 365 



because they be within the brain-pan, as common sense, phantasie y 

 and memory." Of " common sense," "the forepart of the brain is 



It is asserted by Lord Brougham, who positively says that we have a " per- 

 petual sense that we are thinking," " quite independent of all material objects," 

 (p. 56.) that the circumstance of the existence of matter is only an hypothesis, 

 and that materialists grossly and dogmatically assume that matter exists. 

 Now, we do not assume we know, that matter exists. From certain sens- 

 ations, we believe inevitably, intuitively, by the laws of God, that what we 

 term matter exists. He allows, indeed, " that we believe in the existence of 

 matter, because we cannot help it. " (p. 241.) This is enough. As to our minds, 

 we observe that no mind exists in nature but as a property or power of matter. 

 We never see mind. We certainly learn the existence of matter by the property 

 of our brain called mind : but that is no reason for saying that the power called 

 mind exists alone. If it were felt by ourselves to exist, though we had no know- 

 ledge of matter around us, it would only show that we felt personality without 

 knowing the cause of it, without knowing that we had brains. It would show 

 our ignorance only. The elephant, and whale, and the smallest insect, with their 

 sense of personality as real as ours, know nothing of their brains ; yet we know 

 that their mind belongs to a brain. If even we were ignorant of the external world, 

 we should know there is something more than an immaterial soul without dimen- 

 sions. For, though we could live for a time without our external senses, we could 

 not live a few minutes without breathing. We should, as usual, internally feel our 

 personality in that part of space where our head is. We should also internally feel 

 the uneasiness arising from want of breath at a distance from this in the part of 

 space where our lungs are. We should be compelled to will a motion to remove 

 this uneasy sensation. All this must inform us of matter. Nay, could we live 

 without breath, mere heads, since the head might ache in different parts, we 

 should have internal evidence of extension. When Lord Brougham reminds us 

 that we learn the existence of matter only by our minds, he should remember that 

 we are not conscious of our existence till matter makes an impression upon us. 

 The existence of mind as a property of peculiarly arranged and circumstanced 

 matter was fully proved before, and therefore these considerations, like every other 

 fact, harmonise with the account ; and the doctrine of the existence of mind, 

 independently of matter, indicates a want of modern knowledge and involves us 

 in endless absurdity. Its studied display usually proceeds in our profession from 

 rank hypocrisy and malice, as though a materialist may not be a devout Chris- 

 tian, and these pharisees say aloud, " I thank thee, Lord, that I am not as other 

 men are even as this materialist." I agree with the early Christians and Mr. 

 Carmichael (An Essay on such Physical Considerations as are connected ivith Mans 

 ultimate Destination, <fc., by Andrew Carmichael, M.R.I. A. Dublin, 1830.), 

 that, as all nature is one whole, all other created beings are also organised. They 

 and we are in but one spot at a time, and can move from one spot to another : 

 what does so, cannot be else than matter and a property of matter. I consider 

 this alone a proof that we possess no such imaginary thing as an immaterial soul. 

 A masterly exposure of Lord Brougham's strange misstatements and sophisms on 

 the subject of materialism will be found in Observations on the Discourse of 

 Natural Theology by Henry Lord Brougham -, by Thomas Wallace, Esq. LL. D. 



