VOLUNTARY MOTION. 489 



as we have seen in the instance of poor little children, who, when 

 dead asleep, were observed still to move their fingers as if at 



" In the case of some operations which are very familiar to us, we find our- 

 selves unable to attend to, or to recollect, the acts of the will by which they were 

 preceded ; and accordingly, some philosophers of great eminence have called in 

 question the existence of such volitions; and have represented our habitual 

 actions as involuntary and mechanical. But surely the circumstance of our 

 inability to recollect our volitions, does not authorise us to dispute their possi- 

 bility ; any more than our inability to attend to the process of the mind, in 

 estimating the distance of an object from the eye, authorises us to affirm that the 

 perception is instantaneous. Nor does it add any force to the objection to urge, 

 that there are instances in which we find it difficult, or perhaps impossible, to 

 check our habitual actions by a contrary volition. For it must be remembered, 

 that this contrary volition does not remain with us steadily during the whole 

 operation ; but is merely a general intention or resolution, which is banished 

 from the mind, as soon as the occasion presents itself, with which the habitual 

 train of our thoughts and volitions is associated. 



" It may indeed be said, that these observations only prove the possibility that 

 our habitual actions may be voluntary. But if this be admitted, nothing more 

 can well be required; for surely, if these phenomena are clearly explicable 

 from the known and acknowledged laws of the human mind, it would be un- 

 philosophical to devise a new principle, on purpose to account for them. The 

 doctrine, therefore, which I have laid down with respect to the nature of habits, 

 is by no means founded on hypothesis, as has been objected to me by some of 

 my friends ; but, on the contrary, the charge of hypothesis falls on those who 

 attempt to explain them, by saying that they are mechanical or automatic ; a 

 doctrine which, if it is at all intelligible, must be understood as implying the 

 existence of some law of our constitution, which has been hitherto unobserved 

 by philosophers ; and to which, I believe, it will be difficult to find any thing 

 analogous in our constitution." 



" I cannot help thinking it more philosophical to suppose, that these actions 

 which are originally voluntary, always continue so ; although, in the case of 

 operations which are become habitual in consequence of long practice, we may 

 not be able to recollect every differed volition. Thus, in the case of a performer 

 on the harpsichord, I apprehend, that there is an act of the will preceding every 

 motion of every finger, although he may not be able to recollect these volitions 

 afterwards ; and although he may, during the time of his performance, be em- 

 ployed in carrying on a separate train of thought. For, it must be remarked 

 that the most rapid performer can, when he pleases, play so slowly, as to be able 

 to attend to, and to recollect, every separate act of his will in the various move- 

 ments of his fingers ; arid he can gradually accelerate the rate of his execution, 

 till he is unable to recollect these acts. Now, in this instance, one of two sup- 

 positions must be made : the one is, that the operations in the two cases are 

 carried on precisely in the same manner, and differ only in the degree of rapidity; 

 and that when this rapidity exceeds a certain rate, the acts of the will are too 



